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Third Party Actions Under Workmen's
Compensation Act
J. WESTWOOD SMa'n'Ras
At common law any person who wrongfully injures another,
intentionally or negligently, is liable to compensate such
other person for his damages if the injured person is himself free from contributory fault. If the tortfeasor is a servant, acting within the scope of his employment, his employer
(or master) is also liable to answer for the wrong under the
long-established doctrine of respondeat superior,with certain
exceptions in which immunity is granted to the state, or subdivisions thereof, and to charitable institutions. The trend
in modern times has been to narrow, or to entirely abolish,
such immunity. By the Federal Tort Claims Act, for example,
the United States has waived its governmental immunity and
there has been an increasing demand for the adoption of
similar statutes by the several States.
Nevertheless there is an area, under the present law of
Virginia, in which not only the private, business employer,
but also his servant who tortiously cripples or kills another,
is granted absolute immunity from civil liability for his
wrong. It is the thesis of this brief monograph that the Virginia law in this respect should be changed by judicial decision or legislative fiat.
The situation alluded to arises under the Workmen's Compensation Act of Virginia. At common law, if an employee
suffers injury through the negligent breach of a duty owed
to him by his employer, he is entitled to recover his damages
from the employer and there is, of course, no arbitrary ceiling on the amount of damages recoverable. But at common
law the employer was able to avail himself of the defenses
of contributory negligence, assumption of the risk, and the
fellow servant doctrine, with the result that in approximately
80% of the cases the employee lost his case and received no
compensation for his injuries. Horowitz, Workmen's Corn-
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pensation, p. 3 (1944). On the other hand, in the remaining
20% of the cases in which the employee was successful in
breaking through the common law defenses of his employer
he was able to recover full compensation for his injuries,
there being no limit on the amount of damages which a court
or jury might award to him.
In the early years of this century the concept of Workmen's Compensation was accepted in this country. Originating in Germany in 1884 and enlarged in England in 1897,
the idea of compensating a workman for his injuries-not on
the basis of negligence, but on the relation of his injuries to
his job-gained universal favor. Horowitz, op. cit., p. 5. Under
these acts the workman was to be compensated for injuries
"arising out of and in the scope of his employment" regardless of fault or lack of fault on the part of his employer.
But at the same time the liability of the employer was to be
limited so that he would no longer be liable to pay full compensation for the employee's injuries nor be at the mercy
of common law juries. Under the Virginia act, adopted in
1918 and frequently amended, an employer can never be required to pay compensation, even in the most aggravated
sort of case, exceeding the amount of $14,000.00. Va. Code
Ann. § 65-68. If an employee is killed, even by the negligence
of the employer himself, the latter's liability is limited to
the amount of $10,500.00 plus burial expenses not to exceed
$300.00. Va. Code Ann. § 65-62. It is easily seen, therefore,
as the Supreme Court of Appeals has said, that the Workmen's Compensation Act was in the nature of a compromise
between employer and employee. H.mphrees v. Boxley Bros.
Co., 146 Va. 91, 135 S. E. 890 (1926).
The essential element of the compromise was that an employee accepting the Act would give up his common law
rights against his employer in exchange for new rights
against his employer given to him by the Act. "The reason
for the employer's immunity [from common law liability] is
the quid pro quo by which the employer gives up his normal
defenses and assumes automatic liability, while the employee
gives up his right to common law verdicts." Larson, Work-
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men's Compensation, § 72.20 (1952 with 1961 supplement).
This surrender of the employee's common law right against
his employer is provided for in § 65-37 of the Code:
The rights and remedies herein granted to an employee .. . shall exclude all other rights and remedies of
such employee, his personal representative, parent, dependents or next of kin, at common law or otherwise, on
account of such injury, loss of service or death. (Emphasis added.)
If this language were not qualified (as originally it was
not), it might be interpreted to mean that the employee gives
up his common law rights against everyone in the world. But
§ 65-38 of the Code clearly recognizes that the employee still
has his common law rights against third-party tortfeasors.
In providing for subrogation of the employer to the employee's rights against third parties, § 65-38 says that "the
making of a lawful claim against an employer for compensation under this Act . . . shall operate as an assignment to
the employer of any right to recover damages which the
injured employee ... may have against any other party for
such injury or death.....1" This would seem to mean that
the Act does not deprive the employee of his common law
rights against any other party than his employer.
But § 65-99 of the Code must also be considered here. It
provides:
Every employer subject to the compensation provisions
of this Act shall insure the payment of compensation to
his employees in the manner hereinafter provided. While
such insurance remains in force he or those conducting
his business shall only be liable to an employee for personal injury or death by accident to the extent and in
the manner herein specified. (Emphasis added.)
In Feitigv. Chalkley, 185 Va. 96, 38 S. E. 2d 73 (1946), the
Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia was confronted with
an issue which it spelled out in these words:
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The specific inquiry is-Do the words, "any other
party," as used in [Code § 65-38] include a co-employee
or fellow servant, or is a co-employee or fellow servant
included in the phrase, "those conducting his business,"
found in [§ 65-99] ? 185 Va. at p. 101, 38 S. E. 2d at p.
75.
The court held that an injured workman's fellow servant
or co-employee is a person within the meaning of the phrase,
"those conducting his [i.e. the employer's] business" and
hence is immune from liability in a common law action for
injuries which he has negligently caused.
It should be remembered that before the adoption of the
Act the fellow servant rule gave immunity to the master but
did not affect the liability of the servant who immediately
caused harm to his fellow servant. "Of course, the [fellow
servant] doctrines here considered do not affect the liability
of the servant, whose negligence caused the injury, to the
servant injured ....
[T]here is nothing in the fellow servant
situation to change that liability." 2 Mechem, Agency, § 1647
(1914). Under the Act, as interpreted by the Virginia court,
the employer is liable to pay compensation, while the negligent servant who caused the harm is immune from common
law liability and is, of course, not liable to pay compensation
under the Act.
But the Virginia court in Feitig v. Chalkley did not rest
its decision on an interpretation of Code § 65-99 alone. It
pointed out that if an injured servant could recover in a
common law action against his negligent fellow servant, then
under § 65-38 the employer would be subrogated to the injured servant's right of action to the extent of compensation
paid by the employer under the Act. The result would be that
the Act would not cover the entire field of industrial accidents ....
Instead of the loss of such industrial accidents being cast upon business as an expense thereof,
the wages of fellow worlmen will become an ultimate insurance fund for the exoneration of both industry and
compensation insurance carriers for the ultimate loss.
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Instead of providing relief to workmen, it will place in
the power of employers and compensation insurance carriers the right to recoup from workmen loss which should
be borne by the business. 185 Va. at p. 104, 38 S. B. (2d)
atp. 76.
The result reached has been justified as follows:
There is certainly ample justification in compensation theory for extending immunity to fellow employees.
By working in industry, a worker not only runs the risk
of being injured, but of negligently injuring others. Both
risks are inherent in the business, and in neither situation is the individual employee in a position to sustain
the economic loss. Note, Tort Immunity and Workmen's
Compensation,39 Va. L. Rev. 951, 957 (1953).
In any event, the statement quoted above from the court's
opinion would seem to have disposed of the precise issue before the court. But it proceeded to go beyond the immediate
and "specific inquiry" to say:
When the theory, the history and the broad purposes
of the act are considered, it would seem that "other
party," as used in section [65-38], refers exclusively to
those persons who are strangers to the employment and
the work, and does not include those who have accepted
the act and are within the express terms of section [6599]--" 'he, (employer) or those conducting his business."
185 Va. at p. 104, 35 S. E. 2d at p. 76. (Emphasis added.)
In Sykes v. Stone & Webster, 186 Va. 116, 41 S. D. 2d 469
(1947), this new notion that "any other party" means a
"stranger to the employment and the work" was applied to
a limited extent in an action brought by the personal representative of a deceased employee of a sub-contractor to recover for his death caused by the negligence of the principal
contractor. The plaintiff relied on the statute, now § 65-5,
providing that:
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Nothing in this act shall be construed to make, for the
purposes of the act, the employees of an independent
contractor the employees of the person or corporation
employing or contracting with such independent contractor.
Nevertheless the court held that the principal contractor
was the "statutory employer" of the sub-contractor's employee because the Act (in those sections now numbered 65-26
through 65-29) makes the owner, contractor, and sub-contractor liable to pay compensation under the Act to any workman employed by a sub-contractor engaged in "any work
which is a part of his [i.e. the owner's, contractor's, or subcontractor's] trade, business or occupation" as if the workman had been immediately employed by him.
It clearly appears to be the purpose of section 20(a)
[now §§ 65-26 through 65-29] to bring within the operalion of the Compensation Act all persons engaged in any
work that is a part of the trade, business or occupation
of the original party who undertakes as owner, or contracts as contractor, to perform that work, and to make
liable to every employe engaged in that work every such
owner, or contractor, and subcontractor, above such employee. But when the employee reaches an employer in
the ascending scale, of whose trade, business or occupation the work being performed by the employe is not a
part, then that employer is not liable to that employe
for compensation under section 20(a) [now §§ 65-26
through 65-29]. At that point paragraph 5 of section 12
[now § 65-5] intervenes and the employe's right of action
at common law is preserved. 186 Va. at p. 122, 41 S. E.
2d at p. 472. (Emphasis added.)
It will be noted that in Sykes v. Stone & Webster the notion
of a quid pro quo is adhered to. Since the sub-contractor's
employee has a right to recover statutory compensation
under the Act from the principal contractor, it is held that
he has no common law right of action against him.
In tracing the chronological development of the law in
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Virginia it should be noted that in Sears-Roebuck v. Wa~lace,
172 F. 2d 802 (1949), it was held that an employee of a subcontractor who was not engaged in any work that was a part
of the owner's "trade, business or occupation" had not been
given any right against the owner by the Workmen's Compensation Act and therefore was entitled to maintain a common law action against the owner.
And in Coker v. Gunter, 191 Va. 747, 63 S. E. 2d 15 (1951),
the rule of Feitig v. Chalkley, supra, was adhered to.
It was in 1954, in an interpretation of Virginia law by the
Federal Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, that a significant departure was made. In Doane v. Dupont, 209 F. 2d
921 (1954), the court held that an owner's employee who had
been injured through the negligence of servants of an independent contractor (called "sub-contractor" in § 65-26)doing work under contract with the owner-could not recover
from such contractor for his injuries because the contractor
was not a "stranger to the business and the work" of the
owner. Here for the first time the Virginia Workmen's Compensation Act was construed to deprive an injured employee
of his common law right to recover for injuries tortiously inflicted upon him by servants of an independent contractor
even though the Workmen's Compensation Act admittedly
gave him no right to statutory compensation from such contractor. As between the injured employee and the defendant
contractor there was no quid pro quo to support this result.
Furthermore, the owner-employer and his compensation insurance carrier, having paid the limited compensation provided for in the Act, could not recover any reimbursement
from the actual wrongdoers. (This interpretation of the Act
was contrary to that long held by the Industrial Commission
of Virginia, as evidenced by a letter from Mr. W. L. Robinson, Examiner, printed in the appellant's brief in the case at
pp. 27-29.)
It should be noted that the Federal Court ignored the point
made in Sykes v. Stone & Webster, supra, that an injured employee had a right to recover compensation under the Act
from any "employer in the ascending scale" and therefore
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could not maintain a common law action against him. (Emphasis added.) Here for the first time, it was held that
an injured workman could not recover at common law from
an independent contractor in the descending scale even
though the Workmen's Compensation Act gave him no right
to statutory compensation from him. It may be repeated that
there was no quid pro quo here. Dupont was held immune
from liability of any kind to ten employees of the Texas
company who were "severely injured" because of the alleged
negligence of Dupont's engineer and technician in handling
a product of "dangerous character."
Apparently the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals was not
aware of the fact that the very same question of Virginia
law had been considered four years earlier by the United
States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit. In
Haw v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 180 F. 2d 18 (1950), an employee of the owner, engaged in a building job on the owner's
property in Arlington, Virginia, was injured through the
negligence of an independent contractor who had agreed to
do the excavation work. The Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., having
paid Virginia Workmen's Compensation benefits to the injured workman, brought action as his subrogee against the
independent contractor and for his use. The court said:
This case does not involve a question of liability to a
member of the general public, having no connection with
the construction work. Here a worker is alleged to have
been injured through the fault of another worker, hired
and paid for by -a different employer, but engaged in the
same general undertaking. In such a situation ... where
workmen's compensation is available, the question is presented whether that employer should be made liable to
the injured man in a suit for damages ....
In this case,
both parties regarded Virginia law as governing. . ..
Giacomo [the injured workman] was . . . entitled to
workmen's compensation from [his employer]. It is arguable that the accident which happened to him was simply one of the industrial risks which workmen's compensation was designed to cover [citing Feitig v. Chalkley,
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supra, and Sykes v. Stone & Webster, supra]. On the
other hand, full redress is not always produced by the
statutory compensation formula. And apart from recompense to the employee, the compensation insurer had an
interest in any possible recovery which may be obtained
against a third party responsible for the industrial accident. We do not think that the facts of the instant case
require a departure from the ordinary application of the
rules of respondeat superior. We fnd affirmative support for this result in the Virginia compensation act,
which specifically provides for full recovery from a third
party tortfeasor, for the benefit of both the injured employee and the compensation insurer [citing § 65-38 and
§ 65-108].
It might have been thought that the Virginia Supreme
Court of Appeals, at its first opportunity, would have repudiated the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals' interpretation of Virginia law and reached a result consistent with
that in the Hato case. But it was not so to be. In 1957, the
Virginia court had the case of Bea v. Ford, 198 Va. 712,
96 S. E. 2d 92 (1957), in which an employee of a general
contractor was killed through the alleged negligence of an
employee of a sub-contractor and the negligence of the subcontractor, himself, in furnishing a dangerously defective
crane. The Virginia court adopted the reasoning of the
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in the Doane case without
reservation, saying:
In the present case Ford, the defendant, was no
stranger to the business of . . the principal contractor.
On the contrary. .. Ford was a sub-contractor engaged
in an essential part of the work which the principal contractor had to do. Thus he was not an "other party"
within the meaning of Code, § 65-38. Like the principal
contractor, Ford was under the canopy of the Workmen's Compensation Act and not subject to an action at
law for damages for injury to or death of Rea who was
engaged in the same work. Code. § 65-37, supra.198 Va.
at p. 717, 96 S. E. 2d at p. 96.
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Here, again, the reader should be reminded that the result
of this decision was to grant absolute immunity from liability of any kind to a sub-contractor whose own negligence,
as well as that of his servant, allegedly caused the wrongful
death of the plaintiff's intestate.
In Kramer v. Kramer, 199 Va. 409, 100 S. E. 2d 37 (1957),
the Virginia court had a case in which the relationship of the
deceased employee and the defendant was neither "ascending" nor "descending," but horizontal. An employee of one
independent contractor was killed through the alleged negligence of another independent contractor. Both contractors
were engaged in construction work on new portions of a
church building and since it was held that their work was not
within the "trade, business or occupation" of the owner (the
church) the Workmen's Compensation Act did not preclude
recovery. The court said:
If the employee of one independent contractor cannot
sue another independent contractor at common law, it
must be because under the compensation law the plaintiff
is the employee of the defendant, which would mean that
the defendant was liable for compensation to the employees of the plumbing, heating, painting, and all other
contractors with whom the church contracted to do part
of the work on the church building. 199 Va. at p. 418, 100
S. E. 2d at p. 44. (Emphasis added.)
Here we see a re-affirmation of the quid pro quo idea which
is at the basis of the Workmen's Compensation Act. Since
the plaintiff had not been given any substitute right against
the defendant by the Workmen's Compensation Act, he retained his right to recover from the defendant in a common
law action.
Two years later, this principle was either lost sight of or
deliberately discarded in Anderson v. Thorington, 201 Va.
266, 110 S. E. 2d 396 (1959). In its opinion the court apparently dismissed the Kramer case as resting on the ground
that the plaintiff's employer and the defendant independent
contractor were engaged in work which "was not a part of

THIRD PARTY UNDER WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION

309

the trade, business or occupation of the church so as to make
it liable [to pay statutory compensation] under Section 65-

26."
But it neglected to re-state the significance of the last
clause in that statement, which has been quoted above. Anderson, an employee of a New York firm of consulting engineers, was injured through the negligence of employees of a
construction company (Thorington) during the construction
of a bridge. The firm by which Anderson was employed was
a general contractor in relation to the owner. Thorington was
another general contractor. The Workmen's Compensation
Act did not give Anderson any rights against Thorington.
But it was interpreted as taking away his common law rights
against Thorington.
The court reasoned that under Code § 65-26 the employees
of the Engineers had a right to statutory workmen's compensation from the owner and that the employees of Thorington had a like right.
Thus the employees of the Engineers, including Anderson, and the employees of Thorington were statutory
fellow servants. This being so, Anderson could not maintain an action at law against the negligent servants of
Thorington who caused his injury [citing Feitig v.
Ckalkley, viura]. Neither may Anderson maintain this
common law action against Thorington, the principal of
the alleged negligent servants, for this would entitle
Thorington to seek indemnity from its negligent employees which would be tantamount to permitting Anderson to sue such negligent employees directly.
And so Anderson, a project inspector for Parsons, Brinckerhoff, Hall & McDonald, consulting engineers of New York,
is found to be a "fellow servant" of the employees of the
Thorington Construction Company, Inc., a Virginia construetion company.
This extreme application of the fellow servant rule could

hardly have been anticipated in 1837 when the defense was
first suggested in an English case, Priestly v. Fowler. 3 M.
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& W. 1, or in 1841 when it was first adopted in an American
case, Murray v. South CarolinaR. Co., 1 McMull. L. (S. Car.)
385, 36 Am. Dec. 268, and followed a year later in the Massachusetts case of Fairwill v. Boston &I Worcester R. Co., 4
Mete. (Mass.) 49, 38 Am. Dec. 339.
One writer has said:
Very appropriately, this exception was first announced
in South Carolina, then the citadel of human slavery.
It was eagerly adopted in Massachusetts, then the center of the factory system, where some decisions were
then made in favor of great corporations, so preposterous that they have been disregarded in every other
state without even the compliment of refutation. I Shearman and Redfield, Negligence, vi, Introduction (5 ed.,
1898), quoted in Horowitz, Workmen's Compensation, p.
3 (1944).
And compare this statement of the leading authority in the
field of Agency:
Servants employed by different masters engaged in
independent pursuits, though working together at the
same time and place and for the general accomplishment
of the same end, are not usually fellow servants within
the rule. To make them such there must be -a common
employment or the general servant of one master must
for the time being have become the special servant of the
other in whose service the injury occurred. 2 Mechem,
Agency, § 1656 (1914) .
Less than two months later, in Williams v. Gresham Co.,
201 Va. 457, 111 S. E. 2d 498 (1959), it was held that an
owner's employee who was injured through the negligence of
servants of an independent contractor (when they permitted
the follow block of their pile driving apparatus to fall and
strike him) had lost his common law rights against the contractor by virtue of the Workmen's Compensation Act, even
though the Act gave him no right to statutory compensation
from such contractor. The compensation insurance carrier,
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having paid the compensation awarded to the injured workman under the Act, could not recover reimbursement from
the contractor whose servants had caused the harm.
And in Floyd v. Mitchell, 203 Va. 269, 123 S. E. 2d 369
(1962), it was held that the personal representative of an
owner's employee could not recover anything from an independent contractor whose servant had negligently caused the
employee's wrongful death. See, also, Home Indemnity v. Poladian,270 F. 2d 156 (4th Cir. 1959).
The effect of the decisions which have here been discussed
is to take away from an injured employee valuable common
law rights against wrongdoers who have injured him, and
their employers, without giving him any substitute rights
against them in return. It seems unconscionable and unwise
as a matter of State policy to grant to anyone a license to
injure or kill with immunity from civil liability of any kind.
Upon reflection it will be seen that this is the result of the
Doane case and the Virginia cases that have followed it. Advised as to the present state of Virginia law, a contractor
undertaking to do work which is part of the "trade, business
or occupation" of the owner or his principal contractor may
safely tell his workmen to get the job done with all possible
speed, having no regard for the life or safety of any other
workmen except those employed by the contractor's sub-contractors. For under the existing Doane doctrine a contractor
and his workmen will be absolutely immune from civil liability of any kind when they negligently cripple or kill an employee of another employer "engaged in the same operation"
and "not a stranger to the employment and the work," unless
the injured workman's employer is a sub-contractor below
the particular contractor in the hierarchy of contractors engaged in the operation.
In the great majority of states only employers and "statutory employers," who are liable to pay compensation under
Workmen's Compensation Acts, are held to be immune from
liability in common law actions brought by injured workmen.
According to Larson, Workmen's Compensation,§ 72.32 (1952
with 1961 supplement), only two other states, Florida and
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Massachusetts, belong to the minority with which Virginia
is presently aligned.
In 1960, a bill was introduced in the Virginia General Assembly (H. B. 564) providing that while an injured employee 's rights under the Workmen's Compensation Act
should exclude all other rights against his employer, his
"statutory employers," (who by the Act are made liable to
pay him statutory compensation) and the servants of his
employer and statutory employers, nevertheless "nothing
contained in this Act shall be construed to take away by implication any other rights and remedies of such employee, his
personal representative, parents, dependents, or next of kin,
-against any other person, at common law or otherwise, on
account of such injury, loss of service or death."
This bill was passed by the House of Delegates and was
reported favorably by the Courts of Justice Committee of
the Senate, but was defeated in the last moments of the session when its proponents were unable to muster an 80% vote
of the Senate to waive the required constitutional reading.
It is to be hoped that at a future session of the Virginia
Legislature the same, or a similar, bill will be enacted into
law.

